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COMMENT
Is EQUAITY FOUNDATION THE LATEST CHAPTER IN
AMERICA'S CULTURE WAR?'
INTRODUCTION
It has given me pleasure to sustain the constitutionality of
laws that I believe to be as bad as possible, because I
thereby helped to mark the difference between what I
would forbid and what the constitution permits.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes2
"The culture war is a battle over symbols and social institu-
tions and, perhaps, rages most intensely when advocates of the
sexual revolution lock horns with the forces of Orthodox Christian-
ity."3 Recently, one of the most prominent battlegrounds of the
culture war has been over homosexual rights.4 The "homosexual
I- See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO
DEFINE AMERCA (1991).
2 LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL 595 (1991) (quoting Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes), cited in Timothy M. Tymkovich et al., A Tale of Three Theories: Rea-
son and Prejudice in the Battle Over Amendment 2, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 287, 287
(1997).
3- Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legisla-.
tion, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393 (1994). See,
e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that the right of privacy includes the
right to abortion). The Supreme Court's decision in Roe has not settled the issue of abor-
tion. For nearly 200 years the abortion issue was decided by elected legislatures, account-
able to the people, with relatively little violence. In the 25 years following Roe, the abor-
tion debate has not subsided and still divides the nation. See Edwin Meese EII & Rhett
DeHart, Reining in the Federal Judiciary, 80 JUDICATURE 178, 180 (1997).
" See Lino A. Graglia, Romer v. Evans: The People Foiled Again By The Constitu-
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rights movement has become 'a political force to be reckoned
with' in recent years and 'gay rights' legislation seems to be on
top of the homosexual agenda."5 When viewed in this context, two
important questions concerning gay rights must be answered. First,
should the government enact antidiscrimination laws protecting
sexual orientation and behavior?6 Second, if the government choos-
es to enact such laws, is there a constitutionally permissible means
for individuals opposed to that decision to prevent it from doing
so? The uncertainty raised by this second question is the primary
focus of this Comment.
Over the past few years, two major cases have addressed this
issue. In Romer v. Evans,7 the Supreme Court invalidated an
amendment to the Colorado State Constitution, which effectively
repealed any local ordinances granting preferential status based on
sexual orientation and prohibited their reenactment.8 The Court
held that the amendment, known as Amendment 2, violated the
Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment.9 This decision
and its impact on gay rights legislation will be discussed in detail
later in this Comment.
The most recent case to address this issue, and the subject of
this Comment, is Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc.
v. City of Cincinnati.'0 In Equality Foundation, the Sixth Circuit
upheld the constitutionality of an amendment to the City Charter of
Cincinnati." This Comment will take an in depth look at the
Equality Foundation case and how it affects the legal landscape of
"gay rights" cases. In particular, this Comment takes the position
that the Sixth Circuit's opinion is not inconsistent with Romer and
should be upheld.
tion, 68 U. CoLO. L. REv. 409, 413 (1997) ("In recent years, only the issue of abortion
has exceeded the issue of homosexuality in the intensity of feeling and conflict aroused in
the American public.').
5. Duncan, supra note 3, at 397. (internal citations omitted).
6 Clearly, the government does not have an affirmative duty to include sexual orien-
tation in the antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
42 U.S.C. § 12211(a) (1995) (specifically excluding homosexuality and bisexuality from
coverage under the Act).
7- 116 S. Ct 1620 (1995).
8. See id. at 1623.
9- See id.
"0. Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, Nos. 94-3855,
94-3973, 94-4280, 1997 WL 656228, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 1997) [hereinafter Equality
III].
1" See id. at *10, *11.
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I. EQUAL PROTECTION: STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A quick overview of the Supreme Court's equal protection
jurisprudence is needed to understand both Romer and Equality
Foundation.12 The Equal Protection Clause is contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 13 It pro-
vides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."14 The precise meaning of these
words and the manner in which they are applied to individual
cases has been developed by the Supreme Court over many years.
The Court has devised a three-tiered structure to analyze equal
protection claims.
A. Rational Basis Review
"The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid
and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest."'5 This is known as
"rational basis" review and is the most deferential standard of
review. 6 It has been said that rational basis review "is not a li-
cense for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legisla-
tive choices."17 "Nor does it authorize the judiciary to sit as a
superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative
policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental
rights nor proceed along suspect lines."' 8 Under rational basis re-
view, the Court has said that a classification "must be upheld
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably con-
ceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification."' 9 Finally, unlike the other standards, rational basis
review does not require a perfect fit between the ends of the legis-
lation and the means chosen to achieve them.2°
12 This is particularly important because it is arguable whether the Supreme Court
was faithful to their own standard method of analysis in Romer.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14 Id.
's City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
t See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1993).
" Id. at 319 (Kennedy, J.) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 313 (1993)).
"S Id. (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 320 (citations omitted). Consistent with this, the Supreme Court has held that
the state has "no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory
classification" Id.
2 See id. at 321.
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B. Strict Scrutiny
The Court has determined that the deferential standard of ratio-
nal basis review was not always appropriate. The Court began
applying "strict scrutiny" whenever a classification created by a
law or statute infringes on a fundamental righ t or disadvantages
a "suspect class." The Supreme Court has been reluctant to
grant "suspect class" status. Currently, despite repeated attempts to
expand "suspect class" status to other groups, including homosexu-
als, the Court has applied "suspect class" strict scrutiny only in
cases involving race,' alienage," and national origin.' Under
strict scrutiny, the law must be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest.' Strict scrutiny has been called "strict in
theory, fatal in fact," because laws rarely survive this searching
inquiry.27
C. Intermediate or Heightened Scrutiny
The third and final standard of review has been labeled
"heightened" or "intermediate" scrutiny.' This standard has been
applied in cases involving "quasi-suspect" classes, including gen-
der 9 and illegitimacy. 0 Despite the concerted efforts of gay
21. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) ("We
have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the
Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be
closely scrutinized and carefully confined.").
2- See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to
miscegenation statute prohibiting inter-racial marriages).
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) ("Aliens as a class are
a prime example of a discrete and insular minority for whom [strict scrutiny] is appropri-
ate.") (internal citations omitted).
22 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1944) (applying strict
scrutiny to statute which curtailed the civil rights of people of Japanese descent).
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
2' This phrase was coined by Gerald Gunther in his famous Harvard Law Review Su-
preme Court Foreword. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1972).
a See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (applying an intermediate
level of scrutiny to classifications based on gender).
29 See id.; see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982) ("Our decisions also hold that the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies
individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an exceedingly
persuasive justification for the classification.") (internal citations omitted).
20. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (holding that although ille-
gitimacy does not receive the most rigid scrutiny, it is not afforded "toothless" review).
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rights advocates, courts have refused to declare homosexuals a
"quasi-suspect" class subject to heightened scrutiny." Under inter-
mediate or heightened scrutiny, a law must be substantially related
to a legitimate state interest in order to be declared constitution-
al 32
H. ROMER V. EVANS
A. Background
Before delving into a discussion of the Equality Foundation
litigation, the Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans must be
addressed. In Romer, the Court declared an amendment to the
Colorado State Constitution unconstitutional.33 Amendment 2, as
the initiative was known, was designed, at least in part, to "repeal
the growing number of state and local gay rights laws and deny
preferred legal status for homosexuals and bisexuals... ."' Pre-
dictably, the campaign was both expensive and bitter.3 Although
opponents of Amendment 2 spent nearly double the amount of its
supporters, 36 the "proposal passed by a margin of 813,966 to
710,151 (53.4% to 46.6%). ' M The amendment never went into
31 See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 685-86 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (apply-
ing rational basis review to equal protection challenge made by homosexuals); High Tech
Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that homosexuals are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881
F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-
suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d
97, 102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that homosexuals do not comprise a suspect or qua-
si-suspect class).
" See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985).
33 See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct 1620, 1623 (1995). The amendment read:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all
respects self-executing.
COLO. CONST. art. 1, § 30b, cited in Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
' See Tymkovich et al., supra note 2, at 292.
35 See id. at 291.
6 See id. at 294. Amendment 2's opponents spent approximately $750,000 compared
with approximately $375,000 for its supporters. See i.
37. Id.
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effect, however, as a lawsuit was filed and an injunction granted
shortly after the election.38 The litigation that ensued was long
and confusing;39 each state court invalidated the amendment using
a different rationale.' The case eventually came before the Colo-
rado Supreme Court, which declared Amendment 2 unconstitution-
al, claiming it infringed upon a new fundamental right-access to
the political process."
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Colorado Su-
preme Court's result, but on yet another rationale.42 The precise
meaning of Romer and its ultimate impact on future cases is not
certain. While some commentators hailed the decision as a land-
mark for homosexuals,43 closer inspection reveals that this conclu-
sion is overly optimistic on their part. The decision has been wide-
ly criticized by legal commentators, even those who agree with its
outcome. 44 Those who disagree with the outcome have been less
charitable.45 This Comment suggests that Romer may not have as
31 See id.
39. See John Daniel Dailey & Paul Farley, Colorado's Amendment 2: A Result in
Search of a Reason, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 215, 220-41 (1996) (describing the
history of Amendment 2 and the litigation leading up to the Supreme Court). Mr. Dailey
and Mr. Farley were counsel to Colorado before the U.S. Supreme Court in Romer v.
Evans. See id. at 215.
40. See id. at 216 ("Each court that considered the issue found a different rationale for
invalidating the Amendment.").
41- See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 (Colo. 1994). The Colorado Supreme
Court upheld the district court's injunction on the same grounds the first time they heard
the case. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1286 (Colo. 1993) ("In short, Amendment
2 ... infringes on a fundamental right protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution."); see also Dailey & Farley, supra note 39, at 231, 232.
42 See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1624 (1995).
43. See, e.g., Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth: Romer v. Evans and the
Politics of Equal Protection, 45 UCLA L. REV. 453, 454 (1997) ("Romer v. Evans is a
landmark decision.').
' See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, The Missing Pages of the Majority Opinion in Romer v.
Evans, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 387 (1997) (stating that although she applauded the outcome
in Romer, she was "troubled by the opinion"); Caren G. Dubnoff, Romer v. Evans: A Le-
gal and Political Analysis, 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 275 (1997) (commenting that Romer is
"open for future attack" and does not provide homosexuals with a broad array of rights);
Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CoNsT. COMMENTARY 257
(1996) (stating that among legal scholars, Romer "has mostly engendered puzzlement").
4" See, e.g., Dailey & Farley, supra note 39, at 249 (stating that "to reach the result
it did, the Court had to disregard entirely not only well-established precepts of equal pro-
tection jurisprudence, but also the trial court record ... "); Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock
and the Kulterkampf: Supreme Court Storytelling, The Culture War, and Romer v. Evans,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 345, 347 (1997) ("If one searches for sophisticated legal rea-
soning in the Court's decision in Romer, he will be disappointed, because 'there is no
there there'."); Graglia, supra note 4, at 410 ("Few cases demonstrate better than...
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much impact as many gay rights activists hope that it does.
B. The Supreme Court Decision
Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion of the Court.4
He began by quoting Justice Harlan's now-famous admonition from
Plessy v. Ferguson47 that the Constitution "neither knows nor tol-
erates classes among citizens." The Court spent a large portion
of its opinion rejecting Colorado's argument that Amendment 2
merely placed homosexuals in the same position as all other per-
sons. 49 Justice Kennedy rejected this reading of the language as
"implausible." '5 In support of this bold assertion, Kennedy ap-
peared to rely on his belief that "[it is a fair, if not necessary,
inference from the broad language of the amendment that it de-
prives gays and lesbians even of the protection of general laws and
policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and
private settings."'5 In reality, this inference is not as "fair" as
Kennedy implies. As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent,
Kennedy's "fair, if not necessary inference" was explicitly ad-
dressed and rejected by the Colorado Supreme Court.52
Romer the first thing one must know to understand American constitutional law - that it
has very little to do with the Constitution.").
46- See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
47 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
€' Romer, 116 S. CL at 1623 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). One law review article has suggested that Justice Kennedy would have been well
served by reading all of Justice Harlan's dissent, which states:
There is a dangerous tendency in these latter days to enlarge the functions of
the courts, by means of judicial interference with the will of the people...."
Our institutions have the distinguishing characteristic that the three departments
of government are co-ordinate and separate. Each must be kept within the
limits defined by the Constitution.
Dailey & Farley, supra note 39, at 215 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 558) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
'9. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624.
Id. at 1624.
d -I. at 1626.
52 See id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335,
1346 & n.9 (Colo. 1994) ("Amendment 2 is not intended to have any effect on this leg-
islation, but seeks only to prevent the adoption of antidiscrimination laws intended to pro-
tect gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.")). Justice Kennedy's "fair" inference is even more trou-
bling when one recalls that under rational basis review, a classification "must be upheld
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification." See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,
320 (1993). The Romer majority appears to have done the exact opposite, i.e. tried to
find any reasonably conceivable state of facts that would invalidate the Amendment. This
type of selective application of facts and reasoning has led some to describe Romer as a
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Regardless, the basis upon which the majority declared that
Amendment 2 deprived homosexuals of equal protection must be
determined in order to evaluate subsequent cases. Although the
majority devoted a significant portion of the opinion to the issue of
"special" vs. "equal" rights, they did not rely on this distinction to
arrive at their decision. 3 It is also clear the Court did not rely on
the Colorado Supreme Court's creation of a new fundamental right
of participation in the political process to support their decision.'
Furthermore, the Court did not declare homosexuals either a "sus-
pect" or "quasi-suspect" class.5 This is perhaps the most impor-
tant aspect of the Romer decision. It bears repeating. The Supreme
Court did not declare homosexuals to be a suspect class.' The
Supreme Court did not declare homosexuals to be a quasi-suspect
class.57 The Supreme Court did not find a violation of a funda-
result oriented decision. See Dailey & Farley, supra note 39, at 268.
51. See Romer, 116 S. Ct at 1626. The distinction between "special" and "equal"
rights is a significant issue in cases involving gay rights. It is a major point of contention
between gay rights advocates and supporters of legislation such as Amendment 2.
In discussing this "special" vs. "equal" rights debate, Professor Richard Duncan has
commented that:
[W]hen proponents of homosexual rights legislation argue that they are seeking
nothing more than the same civil rights everyone else has, they are wrong for
two reasons. First, they already have the same rights everyone else has, i.e. the
right to be protected on the basis of their race, gender, religion, and other
protected categories. Second, since the general rule continues to be one of free
choice in employment and housing matters, homosexuality is merely one of
countless activities left unprotected by antidiscrimination laws.
Duncan, supra note 3, at 400.
Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer echoed this sentiment by listing a plethora of
reasons an employer may validly use to refuse to hire a person:
The interviewer may refuse to offer a job because the applicant is a Republi-
can; because he is an adulterer, because he went to the wrong prep school or
belongs to the wrong country club; because he eats snails; because he is a
womanizer, because she wears real animal fur, or even because he hates the
Chicago Cubs.
Romer, 116 S. Ct at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). A comprehensive discussion of this
issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
' See Romer, 116 S. Ct at 1624.
55- Id at 1627. Obviously, the lack of clarity in Romer extends to the level of review
given to homosexuals as a class. However, it is clear that the Supreme Court had ample
opportunity to declare homosexuals either a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class and did not
do so. In fact, given the nature of the case and the manner in which it came before the
Court, the logical inference is that they are either unwilling or unable to change the status
of homosexuals under equal protection analysis.
6 See id.
s'- See id.
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mental right.58 The Supreme Court did, however, invalidate the
law, purportedly under rational basis review.5 9
According to the Court, "[A]mendment 2 fails, indeed defies,
even this conventional inquiry."0 Justice Kennedy stated two rea-
sons in support of this position.61 First, he claimed the amend-
ment imposed a broad disability on homosexuals in the form of an
invalid form of legislation.62 One law review article has taken the
position that the Court has thus established a new form of per se
equal protection violation.6 The article gathers modest support for
its contention from language in the opinion declaring that "[a] law
declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of
citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is
itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal
sense.
'
"
4
Justice Scalia referred to this judicial creation as "terminal
silliness." The central thesis of the majority opinion, according
to Scalia, was that "any group is denied equal protection when, to
obtain advantage (or, presumably, to avoid disadvantage), it must
have recourse to a more general and hence more difficult level of
political decisionmaking than others." Although Scalia's view
did not succeed on the facts in Romer, it is important to remember
that the Court never explicitly stated they were creating a new
form of equal protection analysis, and it is doubtful they intended
-a See Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1995).
59. See id. at 1627.
6- Id. Indeed, it seems that the Court had no choice but to insert this disclaimer. Re-
gardless of one's opinion as to the ultimate wisdom of the Court's decision in Romer, it
is obvious that they did not review Amendment 2 in a manner consistent with Justice
Kennedy's own formulation of rational basis review. See supra note 52 and accompanying
text. Kennedy's opinion on this point caused one scholar to exclaim: "It is astounding
that a law can be found to violate the Constitution not only despite, but apparently be-
cause of, the asserted inapplicability of the relevant constitutional doctrine" Graglia, supra
note 4, at 424.
61. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
7 See id.
63. See Leading Case, Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 110 HARV. L. REV.
155, 158 (1996) ("IChe Amendment 'defies' the rational basis test by being a per se vio-
lation of equal protection.").
64 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628; see also Leading Case, supra note 63, at 158. It
may be helpful to recall that Amendment 2 had two primary functions. Fst, it repealed
all laws that granted homosexuals protected status. Second, the amendment prohibited the
future enactment of such laws without amending the State Constitution. The "per se" por-
tion of the opinion deals only with Amendment 2's second function.
65. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1998]
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to do so by implication. In short, assuming this novel justification
was appropriate in Romer, it must be limited to the facts of that
case. The dubious nature of Kennedy's "per se" justification neces-
sitates increased scrutiny on his second purported basis.
Second, Kennedy determined that the "sheer breadth" of the
amendment led inexorably to the conclusion that it was the product
of "animus towards the class it affects." 67 He went on to say that
"a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot consti-
tute a legitimate governmental interest."e Colorado proffered a
number of reasons in support of the amendment 9 Kennedy ad-
dressed none of them. Instead, he insisted that the breadth and
scope of the amendment made it "impossible to credit them." 0
The majority's brusque dismissal of the state's interests is particu-
larly troubling in light of the fact that both the trial court and the
Colorado Supreme Court had found most of these purposes to be
legitimate.
7 1
Predictably, Justice Scalia found the majority's contention that
the amendment is strictly the product of animus, or a bare desire
to harm a politically unpopular group, "nothing short of insult-
ing."72 "No principle set forth in the Constitution, nor any even
imagined by this Court in the past 200 years, prohibits what Colo-
rado has done here." 3 Scalia felt that Amendment 2 was "emi-
nently reasonable" 4 and a "modest attempt by seemingly tolerant
Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts
6 Id. at 1627.
I&. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973)).
69. See id. at 1629. At trial, Colorado argued that a number of legitimate interests
supported Amendment 2:
(1) preventing governmental interference with personal, familial, and religious
privacy; (2) expressing a statewide policy against making sexual orientation an
additional class or characteristic under antidiscrimination laws at the expense of
already protected classes; and (3) restoring the legislative status quo ante by
effectively deregulating local and state enactments extending benefits on the
basis of sexual orientation.
Tymkovich et al., supra note 2, at 300.
7'- Romer, 116 S. CL at 1629.
71. See Tymkovich et al., supra note 2, at 320. "In fact, between them, the two lower
courts recognized that Amendment 2 served--albeit inexacty-three 'compelling' public
purposes: (1) the promotion of religious freedom, (2) the promotion of familial privacy,
and (3) the preservation of associational privacy." Id.
71 Romer, 116 S. CL at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. 1& (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through the
use of laws." 5 In closing, Scalia referred to the Court's opinion
as "an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political will." 6
The majority and dissenting opinions in Romer make for inter-
esting reading.' The majority opinion has been criticized as short
on reasoning and legal precedent and long on emotive utteranc-
es.7" The dissent, on the other hand has been characterized as bit-
teF 9 and inflammatory. 0 When the dust settles, however, Romer
may not stand for very much."' Ultimately, Romer stands for sev-
eral unexceptional principles. First, homosexuals are not a suspect
or quasi-suspect class.82 Second, legislation burdening homosexu-
als shall be analyzed using rational basis review. 3 Third, legisla-
tion which is so broad as to be unexplainable by anything other
than animus towards the group affected is not rational."
III. EQUALIY FOUNDATION
A. Background
Much like Romer, the Equality Foundation litigation has a long
and confusing history. The controversy has its genesis in two city
ordinances passed by the Cincinnati City Council in 1991 and
1992.u These ordinances were designed to prohibit discrimination
within the City of Cincinnati. 6 Both ordinances had provisions
75. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Of course, the Supreme Court is supposed to
"have neither Force nor Vil, but merely judgment." See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 394
(Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992). This is a principle which appears to have
been completely lost on the Romer majority.
T. See Duncan, supra note 45, at 362.
See supra notes 52, 60 and accompanying text.
79 See Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 361, 382 (1997).
8" See id. at 386.
81. See Duncan, supra note 45, at 362 ("Viewed as legal precedent, Romer... does
not even register on the landmark meter.").
2 See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. CL 1620 (1995).
8' See i. at 1627.
, See i. at 1628-29.
'" See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F.
Supp. 417, 421 (S.D. Ohio 1994) [hereinafter Equality 1].
5, See id. The Equal Employment Opportunity Ordinance ("EEO") prohibited discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation in city employment and in the appointment to
city boards and commissions. Id. The Human Rights Ordinance ("HRO') prohibited dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation in private employment, public accommoda-
1998]
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protecting individuals based on sexual orientation.' In direct re-
sponse to the passage of these ordinances, a group of citizens
formed an organization called "Take Back Cincinnati," later re-
named "Equal Rights, Not Special Rights," for the express purpose
of gathering enough signatures to place a proposed amendment to
the city charter on the ballot."8 They succeeded and that proposed
amendment, known as Issue 3, stated:
ARTICLE XII
NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE
GRANTED BASED UPON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION, CONDUCT
OR RELATIONSHIPS.
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commis-
sions may not enact, adopt, enforce or administer any ordi-
nance, regulation, rule or policy which provides that homo-
sexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or
relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a
person with the basis to have any claim of minority or
protected status, quota preference or other preferential treat-
ment.
This provision of the City Charter shall in all respects
be self-executing. Any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy
enacted before this amendment is adopted that violates the
foregoing prohibition shall be null and void and of no
force or effect.89
Following a contentious campaign, the citizens of Cincinnati
voted overwhelmingly in favor of Issue 3 and amended the City
Charter by a vote of 62% to 38%.90 Almost immediately, the
Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati,9' along with several
homosexual males and lesbians, filed suit challenging the constitu-
tions, and housing. Id. In addition to sexual orientation, both ordinances prohibited dis-
crimination on the basis of race, sex, disability, religion, national or ethnic origin, age,
HIV status, Appalachian regional ancestry, and marital status. Id.
87 See id.
m See id. at 422.
89 Id.
.Id.
9' The Equality Foundation is an Ohio not-for-profit corporation, which was formed in
an effort to oppose discrimination and promote antidiscrimination laws which include
sexual orientation. See id. at 423.
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tionality of Issue 3. After a contested evidentiary hearing, the
district court issued a preliminary injunction.93 At trial, the plain-
tiffs raised a number of challenges to Issue 3, including a charge
that it violated their rights to equal protection.94 The Equality
Foundation plaintiffs also asserted that homosexuals comprise either
a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class, thus triggering strict or height-
ened scrutiny.9 In addition, they alleged that Issue 3 violated
homosexuals' fundamental right to equal access to the political
process. 6 Failing at that, the plaintiffs finally alleged that Issue 3
should not survive rational basis review because it is not rationally
related to any legitimate government purpose.'
The City of Cincinnati98 disputed each of these claims."
Cincinnati asserted that Issue 3 furthers a number of legitimate
government interests."° For example, it preserves scarce govern-
ment resources to use in enforcing the already existing anti-dis-
crimination laws and reduces the level of government regulation on
the citizenry.0  They asserted that Issue 3 promotes diversity of
thought on a highly controversial topic by refusing to impose a
uniform, government sponsored view concerning the "moral rele-
vance of homosexual behavior."'" Additionally, Issue 3 gave le-
gal effect to Cincinnati's collective notion of morality and serves
to protect and nurture the nuclear family. 3 Issue 3 also ad-
vanced democracy and political integrity and served as an effective
restriction on the scope of City Council's powers to deal with
certain important issues."'
2 See id. at 422.
9 See id. at 423. The court issued a written opinion three days later setting forth its
findings of fact. See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,
838 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
' See Equality I, 860 F. Supp. at 422. The plaintiffs also alleged Issue 3 was uncon-
stitutionally vague and violated their rights to free speech, free association and redress of
grievances. ld. These challenges will not be discussed here.
9'- See id.
9 See id.
9" See id.
9 Equal Rights Not Special Rights ("ERNSR') intervened as third party defendants as
well. See id.
'9 See id. at 422.
20. See id.
'o' See id. at 423.
102.Id.
"3. See id.
10& See id.
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B. The District Court: Equality I
The district court accepted nearly every argument raised by the
Equality Foundation and rejected every argument raised by the
City. The court began by creating a fundamental right of access to
the political process, which Issue 3 allegedly infringed upon1t 5
The court concluded that under Issue 3, "all citizens, with the
exception of gay, lesbian and bisexuals, have the right to appeal
directly to the city council for legislation," while homosexuals must
amend the City Charter before they can obtain legislation bearing
on their sexual orientation. 6 Since the district court felt Issue 3
infringed upon a fundamental right, the court determined that "it
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."'"
The court did not end its analysis there, however, as it went on
to discuss the proper classification of homosexuals for the purposes
of equal protection analysis." 8 The court, ignoring clear prece-
dent on the issue, purported to elicit factors the Supreme Court has
used to determine whether a class is "suspect" or "quasi-sus-
pect."' Following this "review," the court listed five factors that
it deemed the most important considerations."0 Based on these
considerations, the court declared that "sexual orientation is a qua-
si-suspect classification."''.
. See id. at 430. The district court's analysis was very similar to that used by the
Colorado Supreme Court in Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994). Both courts
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's race and voting rights cases to establish this new
fundamental right. See Equality I, 860 F. Supp. at 430-33.
06- Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. at 433.
'07. Ld. at 434.
'o& See id.
" Id. There can be no doubt why the court purported to engage in this academic ex-
ercise. The precedents are clear. Courts considering this issue have consistently come to
the same conclusion. Homosexuals do not comprise a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See
supra note 31. The district court did acknowledge that its position was not in accord with
numerous Courts of Appeals. Essentially, the court disagreed with "the fundamental under-
pinning of those decisions-that homosexuality is status defined by conduct." Equality 1,
860 F. Supp. at 439.
11. The court's five factors were:
(1) whether an individual's sexual orientation bears any relationship to his or
her ability to perform, or to participate in, or to contribute to, society; (2)
whether the members of the group have any control over their sexual orienta-
tion; (3) whether sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic; (4) whether
that group has suffered a history of discrimination based on their sexual orien-
tation; and (5) whether the class is 'politically powerless'.
Equality I, 860 F. Supp. at 436.
11. Id. A complete discussion of this "five factor" test as well as its application to ho-
[Vol. 48:903
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The court, nevertheless, proceeded to apply rational basis re-
view."' Predictably, the court determined that Issue 3 could not
withstand even this low-level examination. 13 The court admitted
that "[ilt is true that legitimate governmental purposes can, and
have been, articulated in support of Issue 3."'14 However, the
court invalidated Issue 3, finding that it was not rationally related
to the government interests." 5 The court, foreshadowing Romer,
then stated that Issue 3 "implies nothing more than a 'bare desire
to harm an unpopular group'.""1 6 The court relied on its own
speculative interpretation of Issue 3 to arrive at this conclusion. 7
This conclusion runs directly contrary to the court's own admoni-
tion only twenty two pages before, that "nothing in this Order
should be construed in any way as impugning the integrity or
motives of those who -oted in favor of the passage of the Issue 3
Amendment." 3
mosexuals is beyond the scope of this Comment. A cursory examination, however, reveals
that this test does not compel the result arrived at by the court. An in-depth analysis of
the district court's findings is unnecessary, however, in light of the fact that they are con-
try to the decisions of both the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court. See Romer v. Ev-
ans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1995); Equality 111, 1997 WL 656228, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 23,
1997); Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261
(6th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Equality 11].
"7- See Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. at 440. The court clearly attempted to avoid a rever-
sal by invalidating Issue 3 on every basis imaginable. The court's valiant effort was un-
successful.
13 See Id. at 441.
14 Id. at 443. It should be noted that the government need not "articulate" any legiti-
mate purpose in order to survive rational basis review. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,
320 (1993). In fact the classification "must be upheld against equal protection challenge if
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
the classification." Id. (citations omitted). For a list of the legitimate purposes asserted by
the City, see supra text accompanying notes 100-04.
US. See Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. at 441.
I ld. at 443 (citations omitted).
II. See id. The court stated that the purpose "not- only to permit discrimination, but
also to encourage it is inherent in [Issue 3]." Id.
"8 Id. at 421. The district court is clearly being disingenuous somewhere in its opin-
ion. The court's contrasting statements lead to a few observations. First, the court has ap-
parently distinguished between those who voted for Issue 3 and those who drafted, lob-
bied and campaigned for its passage. The court has denied that it is attributing animus
towards the voters, and yet has invalidated the amendment because it is the product of
animus. Second, and even more disturbing, is the court's implicit suggestion that the vot-
ers did not know what they were voting for. Even if the court were correct in its as-
sumption (which is dubious), it is not the proper role of the court to invalidate legislation
on these grounds. The court's elitist attitude toward the voters of Cincinnati is completely
inappropriate and offensive.
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C. The Court of Appeals: Equality Foundation II
The plaintiff's victory was short-lived, however, when the Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court in a unanimous decision. 119 The
Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected the district court's determination
that homosexuals comprise a quasi-suspect class.' Judge
Krupansky characterized this finding as "novel.'' The lower
court was also admonished for virtually ignoring the decision of
"every circuit court which has addressed the issue."'" Krupansky
found the lower court's efforts to distinguish these cases on the
basis of a distinction between status and conduct unpersuasive."
The Sixth Circuit stated that people having a "homosexual orienta-
tion" do not comprise an identifiable class,'2 and that "[t]hose
persons who fall within the orbit of legislation concerning sexual
orientation are so affected not because of their orientation, but
rather by their conduct which identifies them as homosexual, bisex-
ual, or heterosexual. '' "a
The court of appeals also rejected the trial court's alternative
holding that Issue 3 had deprived homosexuals of a fundamental
right to participate in the political process. t 6 They referred to
this as an "innovative right."'2' 7 The court pointed out that the
cases cited by the district court involved racial classifications,"
which are always suspect, and the fundamental right to vote,'29
"9- See Equality II, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995). The decision was 3-0, with circuit
judge Krupansky writing the opinion. See i. at 263.
'a See id. at 268.
121. Id. at 266. The court also observed that the lower court misconstrued Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy. Id. at 196. In doing so, the Court held that homosexuals possess
no fundamental right to engage in homosexual conduct. Id. at 194-95.
n Equality 11, 54 F.3d at 266. See also supra note 31 for a brief survey of Circuit
holdings on the subject.
,3- See Equality 11, 54 F.3d at 267. The trial court had found that homosexuals are
not identified by any particular conduct, rather they are distinguished by "sexual orienta-
tion," which encompasses an "innate and involuntary state of being and set of drives." Id.
124. See id.
"s. Id. The court concluded that it is virtually impossible to distinguish between per-
sons of a particular orientation and those who actually engage in that particular type of
conduct. See id. See also Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463-64 (7th Cir. 1989)
(homosexual orientation is compelling evidence that the plaintiff has engaged in homosex-
ual conduct and likely will do so again).
'2 See Equality II, 54 F.3d at 268.
127 Id.
2& See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 471 (1982)
('[D]espite its facial neutrality there is little doubt that the initiative was effectively drawn
for racial purposes.").
"2'. See, e.g., Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (involving the recognized fundamen-
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which also independently triggers strict scrutiny, and thus found
them inapplicable here.130 The court concluded that homosexuals
had not been deprived of any fundamental right, rather "[tlhose
who opposed Issue 3 simply lost one battle in an ongoing political
dispute. 13
Having determined that Issue 3 should not be analyzed under
strict or heightened scrutiny, the court turned to the rational basis
test. They held that Issue 3 easily passed rational basis review,
stating that it "potentially furthered a litany of valid community
interests."'32 In particular, it enhanced associational liberty, re-
duced governmental regulation, potentially saved municipal resourc-
es, and returned the municipal government "to a position of neu-
trality on the issue.' 33 As such, Issue 3 was rationally related to
a legitimate state objective, did not violate any "constitutionally
protected right and may stand as enacted."' 34
D. Equality Foundation: Supreme Court
On June 17, 1996, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit, and remanded
the case for further consideration in light of Romer. 31 The Court
divided along the same lines as the Romer decision with Justices
Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas again dissenting. 36 Justice Scalia
argued that the case was easily distinguishable from Romer because
it involved the "lowest electoral subunit" as opposed to the entire
state. ' He believed that the consequence of invalidating the Cin-
cinnati provision "would be that nowhere in the country may the
people decide, in democratic fashion, not to accord special protec-
tion to homosexuals.' 38 Scalia argued that the Court should have
denied certiorari, "or else set the case for argument to decide for
ourselves the ultra-Romer issue that it presents.' ' 39 Despite these
protestations, the case went back to the Sixth Circuit for reconsid-
tal right to vote).
'30- See Equality 1I, 54 F.3d at 268-69.
131- Id. at 269.
132 id. at 270.
133. id.
3. Id. at 271.
'35. See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 116 S.
Ct. 2519 (1996).
13. See id.
137- Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18 1&. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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eration.
E. The Remand: Equality Foundation III
On October 23, 1997, the Sixth Circuit issued its much antici-
pated decision.'" On remand, the Sixth Circuit faced the chal-
lenge of determining what Romer actually meant,14 1 as well as
how it affected Cincinnati's Issue 3. The court, again speaking
through Judge Krupansky, began by discussing what Romer did not
mean. In particular, they noted that although the Colorado Amend-
ment had been struck down, the Court had rejected the "fundamen-
tal right to participate in the political process"142 argument and
failed to subject Amendment 2 to either "strict" or "heightened"
scrutiny. 43 Essentially, the Sixth Circuit saw Romer as (1) recon-
firming the traditional tripartite equal protection analysis, and (2)
establishing that laws burdening homosexuals should be subjected
to rational basis review. 44  The Sixth Circuit emphasized that
Romer actually confirmned the standard of review and method of
analysis used in their earlier decision, albeit with different re-
sults. 4 The court felt that "[ain exacting comparative analysis of
Romer with the facts and circumstances of this case, disclose that
these contrary results were reached because the two cases involved
substantially different enactments of entirely distinct scope and
impact, which conceptually and analytically distinguished the con-
stitutional posture of the two measures."'
46
The Sixth Circuit began by comparing the language of the two
enactments. 47 Upon doing so, they determined that the "more re-
stricted reach of [Issue 3], as compared to the actual and potential
sweep of Colorado Amendment 2, [was] noteworthy."'" Specif-
ically, when read in its full context, the language of Issue 3 "mere-
ly prevented homosexuals, as homosexuals, from obtaining special
'40- See Equality III, 1997 WL 656228, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 1997). The decision
was once again unanimous, 3-0. See id.
141. The virtual flood of law review articles and commentary on the case provide am-
ple evidence that the precise meaning of the Romer decision is not clear from the opin-
ion.
14, See Equality 111, 1997 WL 656228, at *3.
143. See id.
'"4 See id.
145. See id. at *4.
14& Id.
'47 See id. at *6.
4" Id. at *5.
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privileges and preferences (such as affirmative action preferences or
the legally sanctioned power to force employers, landlords, and
merchants to transact business with them) from the City."1 49 In
contrast, Colorado's Amendment 2 "could be construed to exclude
homosexuals from the protection of every Colorado state law,
including laws generally applicable to all other Colora-
dans... .,5" The Supreme Court in Romer feared that Amend-
ment 2 would have the effect of making homosexuals virtual non-
citizens, in essence deeming a "class of persons a stranger to its
laws."'' The Court declared this a "denial of equal protec-
tion ... in the most literal sense.'
52
The court of appeals did not find this concern applicable in
this case. Issue 3, by contrast, "had no such sweeping and con-
scious-shocking effect."'53 First, since the amendment applied on-
ly at the lowest (municipal) level, it could not remove any rights
homosexuals received from any higher level of government. 4
Second, the narrow restrictive language of Issue 3 "could not be
construed to deprive homosexuals of all legal protections even
under municipal law, but instead eliminated only 'special class
status' and 'preferential treatment' for gays as gays under Cincin-
nati ordinances and policies. . . ,."
The court felt that the "low level of government at which
[Issue 3] becomes operative is significant ... ."s' Homosexuals
in Colorado would have been forced to amend the State constitu-
tion in order to obtain relief, whereas homosexuals in Cincinnati
9- Id. at *6.
'-'0 1&. The Sixth Circuit relied on Justice Kennedy's reading of Amendment 2 for this
distinction. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1626 (1995) ("It is a fair, if not neces-
sary, inference from the broad language of the amendment that it deprives gays and lesbi-
ans even of the protection of the general laws. .. ).
. Equality III, 1997 WL 656228, at *6 & n.7 (quoting Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629).
,S2. See Romer, 116 S. CL at 1628.
,s Equality III, 1997 WL 656228, at *6.
' See i& This is not a distinction without a difference. It is important to remember
that the alleged constitutional infimity of Issue 3 is not the decision excluding homosexu-
als from the antidiscrimination provisions. Nor is it the decision to repeal the existing city
ordinances which included sexual orientation. "It is always legitimate public policy for
voters or legislatures to repeal disfavored laws. No law, including civil rights legislation,
can be seen as a one-way street." Tymkovich et al., supra note 2, at 301. Rather, the al-
leged violation of equal protection is that Issue 3 unfairly makes it too difficult to alter
the existing laws. In this situation it seems obvious that the difference between a city and
a state is quite relevant.
,5. Equality 11I, 1997 WL 656228, at *6.
'' IdX at *7.
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would need not undertake such a monumental political task."s In
particular, they may "seek local repeal of the subject amendment
through ordinary political processes, or pursue relief from every
higher level of Ohio government including, but not limited to
Hamilton County, state agencies, the Ohio legislature, or the voters
themselves via a statewide initiative."'58 The court declared that a
reading of Romer which would prohibit enactments such as Issue 3
would "disenfranchise the voters of their most fundamental right
which is the very foundation of the democratic form of govern-
ment .... vYI59
Next, the court of appeals addressed the Supreme Court's sec-
ond proffered justification in Romer, the Amendment's "sheer
breadth." The Sixth Circuit concluded that the majority's inability
to find a rational basis in Romer "hinged upon the wide breadth of
Colorado Amendment 2.... ."o In Romer, the Supreme Court
stated that the massive scope and effect of Amendment 2 raised
the inference that the "disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected.' 61 Consequently, the Court
found the state's justifications "impossible to credit.' 62
Issue 3, by contrast, "constituted local legislation of a purely
local scope."' 63 Since the enactment was purely local, the voters
"had clear, actual, and direct individual and collective interests in
[the] measure. . . ."'6 Issue 3 lacks the breadth that was fatal to
Colorado Amendment 2. The Sixth Circuit also addressed and
explicitly rejected any suggestion that the amendment was motivat-
17. See id.
'58. Id. at *7. Furthermore, the court noted that, "unlike Colorado Amendment 2, which
interfered with the expression of local community preferences in that state, the Cincinnati
Charter Amendment [Issue 3] constituted a direct expression of the local community will
on a subject of direct consequence to the voters." Id. This point is not insignificant. In
Colorado, Amendment 2 had the effect of overriding the local community preferences of
voters in communities such as Aspen and Boulder. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620,
1623 (1995) (explaining that "[w]hat gave rise to the statewide controversy was the pro-
tection the ordinances [in cities, such as Aspen and Boulder] afforded to persons discrimi-
nated against by reason of their sexual orientation"). In Cincinnati, Issue 3 had the effect
of preserving local community will rather than overriding it. The two situations are differ-
ent in this respect as well.
'" Equality III, 1997 WL 656228, at *8.
16. Id. at *9.
6 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
' Id. at 1628-29.
163. Equality 111, 1997 WL 656228, at *10.
16k Id.
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ed by animus.' They stated that, "[bleyond contradiction, pas-
sage of [Issue 3] was not facially animated solely by an impermis-
sible naked desire of a majority to injure an unpopular group of
citizens.... ."" Therefore, the court proceeded to apply rational
basis review to the enactment.167
The court further determined that Issue 3 implicated "at least
one issue of direct, actual, and practical importance to those who
voted it into law... ."" In particular, it implicated whether or
not the voters would be "legally compelled by municipal ordinanc-
es to expend their own public and private resources to guarantee
and enforce nondiscrimination against gays in local commercial
transactions and social intercourse." 69 The court held that this
165 See id
6 Id. (emphasis added). There is simply no way to know for certain why an individ-
ual voted in a particular manner. In the typical case, each voter will base his or her deci-
sion on a multitude of considerations, each weighted differently. It is arrogant for a court
to presume that it possesses the ability to accurately determine the sole motive of the vot-
ers in an election.
Judge Boggs of the Sixth Circuit posited several hypothetical examples illustrating
the diversity of considerations that may have played a role in the passage of Issue 3.
Fred is a small business owner. Fred is homosexual and has many homosexual employees.
He is concerned that he will be more vulnerable to lawsuits than other business owners if
Issue 3 fails because he has so many homosexual employees. Fred votes for Issue 3.
Sally is a lesbian as well as a libertarian. Although she feels it is morally wrong and
stupid to discriminate against homosexuals, she does not believe the government has a
right to interfere with other people's market choices. Therefore Sally votes in favor of
Issue 3. A third example illuminates the point further. Irving is a homosexual as well. He
believes that if Issue 3 fails, employers will actually increase covert discrimination in
initial hiring to protect against the possibility of later lawsuits. He believes that once he
is hired, he will not be discriminated against because of his skills. Irving also votes in
favor of Issue 3. See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincin-
nati, No. 94-3855, 94-3973, 94-4280, 1998 WL101701 at *2, *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998)
(Boggs, J., concurring) (stating that each of the hypothetical voters described above could
not justly be deemed irrational).
The Sixth Circuit has not attempted to determine the motives underlying the passage
of Issue 3. The court has not attempted to determine the motives of the electorate. Rath-
er, the court has merely pointed out the impossibility of doing so. Consistent with this
position, the court rejected the contention that Issue 3 was motivated "solely" by animus
towards homosexuals. This is quite distinct from a court boldly cfaiming to know the
motives of over 800,000 voters in Colorado.
'6" See Equality III, 1997 WL 656228, at *10. It should be recalled that the Supreme
Court in Romer did not seriously address Colorado's proffered interests. Justice Kennedy
dismissed them almost without mention, stating that "the breadth of the Amendment is so
far removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them."
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
' Equality 11, 1997 WL 656228, at *10.
'69 Id. The court noted that the city would be forced to bear these costs alone "be-
cause no coextensive protection exists under federal or state law." Id.
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interest alone was sufficient to uphold the constitutionality of the
amendment under. rational basis review. 7° The court concluded
by stating that the Cincinnati amendment "cannot be characterized
as an irrational measure fashioned only to harm an unpopular seg-
ment of the population in a sweeping and unjustifiable man-
ner."
171
IV. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
The future for Equality Foundation is not certain. The case
appears destined for the United States Supreme Court. 72 On Feb-
ruary 5, 1998, a majority of the Sixth Circuit denied en banc re-
view of the earlier three-judge decision."73 The plaintiff's lead
attorney, Alphonse Gerhardstein, has indicated that he will appeal
the decision to the Supreme Court. 74 At that point, the Court
will have several options. They may deny certiorari and allow the
decision to stand. They may grant certiorari, hear the case, and
affirm. Or they may grant certiorari, hear the case, and reverse.
Which course the Court chooses to pursue will answer, in some
fashion, many of the questions left unanswered in Romer. Was
Romer a landmark case in gay rights litigation? 75 Was it merely
a weak case limited to its facts? 76 Equality Foundation may pro-
vide the answers.
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari, hear the case, and
affirm. There are a number of reasons why the Court should pro-
ceed in this manner. One major reason is the patent inadequacy of
Romer. The decision has left people on both sides of the issue
dissatisfied and disappointed." It does not provide lower courts
with a clear holding or even a structure within which to evaluate
cases involving similar issues. One commentator has written that
""0. See id. The court went on to say that "discussion of equally justifiable community
interests, including the application of the associational liberty and community moral disap-
proval of homosexuality, is unnecessary to sustain [Issue 3's] viability." Id.
171. id.
272. See Kelly McMurry, Cincinnati antigay measure upheld by Sixth Circuit, TRiAL,
Apr. 1998, at 105.
173. See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. 94-
3855, 94-3973, 94-4282, 1998 WL 101701 at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998); see also
McMurry, supra note 172, at 105.
174. See McMurry, supra note 172, at 105.
275. See supra text accompanying note 43.
276 See supra text accompanying note 66.
"n. See supra notes 44-45.
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"the shallowness of Justice Kennedy's opinion rivals that of the
Platte River in a drought year."'78 The Court needs to provide
adequate guidance both to local governments and the lower courts
so that they can properly handle issues involving homosexuals and
sexual orientation.
Another reason the Court should affirm the Sixth Circuit's
decision is more basic. Equality Foundation was correctly decided.
The decision may offend those in legal academia, for whom "gain-
ing full approval of homosexuality is the cause celebre of the
day,""'7 9 but it is still correct. With all of the heated rhetoric sur-
rounding homosexual issues80 it can be easy to lose sight of the
facts. The facts are these: Issue 3 does not declare that homosexu-
ality is bad or evil. Issue 3 does not say that homosexuality should
be punished. Issue 3 does not say that homosexuals should be
discriminated against. Issue 3 merely reflects a judgment, made by
an overwhelming majority of the citizens of Cincinnati, that they
do not want to include sexual orientation in the list of protected
characteristics under their antidiscrimination laws.
The Sixth Circuit's decision is correct because that judgment,
and the means chosen to effectuate it, do not violate the Consti-
tution. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit's decision does not conflict
with the Supreme Court's opinion in Romer. Simply put, homosex-
uals do not comprise a suspect class.'8 ' Homosexuals do not
comprise a quasi-suspect class.'82 Laws burdening homosexuals
should be analyzed under rational basis review.8 3 This is precise-
ly what the Sixth Circuit did. The difference in outcome is due to
the fact that Issue 3 was rationally related to a number of legiti-
mate government objectives,'8 4 whereas the breadth of Colorado
Amendment 2 made the state's proffered objectives "impossible to
credit."'
185
General policy considerations also support the Sixth Circuit's
1" Duncan, supra note 45, at 353.
179. Graglia, supra note 4, at 427.
'm See, e.g., Richard F, Duncan, Homosexual Marriage and the Myth of Tolerance: Is
Cardinal O'Connor a Homophobe?, 10 NOTPR- DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 587,
607 (1996) (arguing that the "gay political agenda is not a tolerant agenda ... and those
who stand in way of this effort to transform human community... will be (must be)
delegitinized, marginalized, and even demonized ...
". See supra text accompanying note 57.
182- See supra text accompanying note 56.
1'8 See supra text accompanying note 31.
"' See Equality III, 1997 WL 656228, at *10 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 1997).
'"* See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1995).
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decision in Equality III. Far too often, today's Court has forgotten
the principle embodied in Justice Holmes' statement.186  The
Court needs to remember that there is a difference between what
they "would forbid and what the constitution permits."'" The
Court should refrain from result oriented decisions that "invent[,
rather than interpret[], constitutional law."'88 Despite protestations
to the contrary, decisions like Romer place "the prestige of [the
Supreme Court] behind the proposition that opposition to homosex-
uality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias."'8 9 This is a
course upon which the Court should not embark.
On this issue, there are two points worth mentioning. First, it
is undisputed that there is no affirmative duty to include sexual
orientation in the set of classes protected by antidiscrimination
laws.' Second, this country is a free society, and "the general
principle is one of free choice.'' 9. There are, of course, excep-
tions to this principle of free choice.' 92 It is important to remem-
ber, however, that these are exceptions and not the rule. 93 A
common strategy utilized by gay activists to justify their inclusion
in antidiscrimination statutes and marginalize the beliefs of those
who oppose them is to compare homosexuals to African-Ameri-
cans.' 94 Such a comparison is laughable. Equating homosexuals
with those who have suffered racial persecution is completely inap-
propriate 95  and does a tremendous disservice to racial
minorities. 196 An individual's race tells us nothing about that
". See supra text accompanying note 2.
187. .
'a Steven A. Delchin, Comment, Scalia 18:22: Thou Shalt Not Lie With The Aca-
demic Elite; It Is An Abomination-Romer v. Evans and America's Culture War, 47 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 207, 252 (1996).
"9- Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As a point of clarification, op-
position to homosexuality as expressed in this Comment means moral disapproval of ho-
mosexual conduct and a homosexual lifestyle. "Moral objection to homosexual practices is
not the same thing as animus, unless all disapprovals based on morality are to be disal-
lowed as mere animus." ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAI: MODERN
LIBERAusM AND AMEICAN DECuNE 113 (1996).
'9. See supra note 6.
191. Duncan, supra note 3, at 399. Generally speaking, this means that an individual
may manage his business without interference from the government. In the context of
employment, this individual may hire and fire whomever he or she desires. See id.
192. See id. at 400; see also, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1995) (prohibiting discrimi-
nation in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin).
'93. See Duncan, supra note 3, at 400.
194. id
'95. See id at 401-15.
'96- See Richard F. Duncan & Gary L. Young, Homosexual Rights and Citizen Initia-
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individual's character and therefore is a "morally neutral character-
istic" '"Sexual orientation, on the other hand, is not a morally
neutral characteristic. 98 It tells a great deal about an individual's
character because it "tells us what a person does (or what he [or
she] is inclined to do)." ' 99
Aside from the obvious differences between race and homosex-
uality, there is yet another important reason the comparison is not
justified. Simply put, there is no need to depart from the general
principle of free choice with respect to homosexuals. "The primary
purpose of our Nation's civil rights laws prohibiting racial discrimi-
nation was to remedy the severe economic deprivation caused by
pervasive discrimination against blacks and other racial minori-
ties." Furthermore, it is undeniable that the civil rights laws
were enacted against a "background of devastating and widespread
discrimination." '  This is simply not the case with homosexuals.
In fact, the economic plight of homosexuals is directly opposite
that of African-Americans.' A number of studies, including the
1990 U.S. Census, reveal that male homosexual households are the
most affluent group in society. 3 African-Americans are no doubt
waiting for this kind of discrimination to start affecting them.
If the Court is not prepared to affirm the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion, they should deny certiorari and allow the decision to stand.
This is not preferred because it would leave unanswered many
questions left open by Romer. Under this scenario, lower courts
would be forced to interpret Romer if, and when, the situation
arose. Each circuit would, of course, be free to consider the Sixth
tives: Is Constitutionalism Unconstitutional?, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETICS & PUB. POL'Y
93, 101 (1995). Gen. Colin Powell, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
an African-American has commented that "Skin color is a benign, non-behavioral charac-
teristic. Sexual orientation is perhaps the most profound of human behavioral characteris-
tics. Comparison of the two is a convenient but invalid argument." Id. at n.49 (quoting
Elmo Zurmwalt, Jr., Guidance from Gen. Powell, WASH. TIMES, June 4, 1992, at G3).
197 See Duncan, supra note 3, at 403. Professor Duncan states that "Dr. Martin Luther
King had a seminal insight when he taught us that racial discrimination is anathema be-
cause people should be judged by the content of their character, not by the color of their
skin" Id. at 402.
19. See id. "Sexual conduct and preferences are fraught with moral and religious sig-
nificance." Id. at 403-04. This is true regardless of what significance different individuals
choose to give homosexual conduct. See id. at 404-05.
"9. Id. at 403.
2 Id. at 406.
201. id.
2*L See id. at 407-08.
2 See id. at 408-09.
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Circuit's decision in Equality Foundation.2 4 A decision not to
hear the case would leave this area of law somewhat unsettled and
the contours of what is permissible and what is not would remain
unclear. However, the Court may have various political and person-
al reasons for leaving these issues open for another day.os
The least acceptable- option mentioned in this Comment would
be for the Court to reverse the Sixth Circuit. This would require an
unwarranted extension of Romer. In order to explain why such an
extension would be unwarranted, a few comments bear repeating.
First, although Romer purported to apply rational basis review, the
manner in which the Court did so was not consistent with tradi-
tional equal protection analysis.' The Court should not depart
any further from the traditional method of analysis. For better or
worse, the traditional three tiered analysis provides structure and
consistency.' When the Court goes beyond this structure, there
is often little principled basis for their decisions.' Similarly, the
Court's vague assertion that Amendment 2 constituted some form
of per se violation of equal protection is not supported by prece-
dent and is not a sound basis for making a decision of this im-
port.2 9
' Outside of the Sixth Circuit, the decision would obviously not be controlling au-
thority. Furthermore, the denial of certiorari itself has no precedential value. See Agoston
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844 (1950) ("Such a denial, it has been re-
peatedly stated, imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of a case."). The denial
of certiorari merely means that "fewer than four members of the Court deemed it desir-
able to review a decision of a lower court." Id.
" For example, some members of the Court may be hesitant to hear the case if they
believe that the different circumstances of this case would weaken the Romer decision.
2 See supra notes 45, 60 and accompanying text.
2 Obviously, this is only true when the Court actually adheres to it when analyzing
cases.
28 See Graglia, supra note 4, at 411 (arguing that in equal protection cases, the Jus-
tices reach their decisions "on no other basis than their personal disapproval of the choic-
es and their willingness to have their own views prevail.").
2. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1633 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("No
principle set forth in the Constitution, nor even imagined by this Court in the past 200
years, prohibits what Colorado has done here."). It has been suggested that Romer demon-
strates that the Supreme Court is often more concerned with the opinions of elite law
professors and constitutional scholars than the actual Constitution. See Graglia, supra note
4, at 409-10 ("What more shattering curse could one hurl at an enemy than 'May your
suit in the Supreme Court be opposed by Professors Tribe, Ely, Gunther, Kurland, and
Sullivan'.'). The theory of a "per se" violation was proposed to the Court as an alterna-
tive justification for invalidating Amendment 2 in an arnicus brief filed by the aforemen-
tioned constitutional law scholars. See id. at 417-20; see also Tymkovich et al., supra
note 2, at 322 ('Tribe argued that Amendment 2 was "per se" unconstitutional. . ).
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Second, the Romer majority relied on the sheer breadth of the
Amendment to conclude that it was motivated by animus or a bare
desire to harm homosexuals.21° This was a bold assertion in
Romer and there is no reason to extend it beyond that case. An
inquiry into the motives of the voters is an impossible task. The
Court in Romer, apparently undaunted by this fact, purported to do
it anyway. Regardless of the propriety of that determination in
Romer, it is inexcusable to make it a standard practice.2" Absent
further mental gymnastics by the Court, this portion of Romer
should be limited to the facts of that case.
The implication that the Supreme Court can and should "deter-
mine" the "motives" behind the enactment of legislation, particular-
ly voter referendums such as Issue 3, is frightening. This would
allow the Court to invalidate almost any legislation that disfavors a
group based entirely on the Court's assessment of the motives for
enacting it.2  Several common sense considerations counsel
against this. First of all, this is not the proper function of the
courts. The courts are supposed to make judgments based on the
law. Second, there is no reason to believe the courts are even
moderately skilled at performing the task. Third, the practical con-
cerns raised by this type of inquiry are overwhelming. Ascertaining
legislative intent is difficult enough when the enactment is passed
by the legislature. It is ludicrous to think that a court will be able
to ascertain the "true" motive or intent of the voters on this or any
other issue.213 Furthermore, even if some individual voters are
motivated by considerations the Court deems unacceptable, this
does not invalidate the law.214 In short, reversing the Sixth Cir-
cuit would be a mistake.
20. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
211. The difficulty of determining the "motives" of the voters has been discussed supra
note 166.
22 "[A] lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a particular group does not always
deny equal protection. Under any such holding, presumably a State would not be able to
require referendums on any subject ... because they would always disadvantage some
group." James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971).
2. See supra note 166.
2I Even Justice Stevens acknowledges this fact. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,
91 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I am also persuaded that a political decision that af-
fects group voting rights may be valid even if it can be proved that irrational or invidi-
ous factors have played some part in its enactment or retention."); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("A law conscripting clerics should not
be invalidated because an atheist voted for it.").
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V. CONCLUSION
The decision in Equality Foundation is correct. It returns the
government to its proper position of neutrality in the latest battle in
the culture war."' In decisions such as Romer, the Court is dan-
gerously overstepping its bounds. The Supreme Court should accept
the fact that the federal courts, with unelected and unaccountable
federal judges, are not the appropriate forum to decide complex
issues of morality such as homosexuality. Furthermore, judicial
activism is especially dangerous when it allows the Court to over-
ride the will of the people." 6 It is even more offensive when the
issue is intensely controversial and involves profound social and
moral considerations. When the Court endeavors to impose its own
view of homosexuality on the people, they are not performing the
task they were assigned. The Sixth Circuit has refused to take sides
on a controversial issue and its decision should stand.
PATRICK J. NORTON
2"3. For an excellent discussion of how the gay rights movement attempts to impose its
view of morality on society, while at the same time stigmatizing and marginalizing the
thoughts and beliefs of those who oppose them, see Duncan, supra note 180.
2' The Supreme Court's "influence is ... diminished when its opinions are weakly
argued or ambiguous [and the] Court weakens its position when it fails to address those
objections most likely to resonate in the public debate." Dubnoff, supra note 44, at 277.
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